Parity and Procedural Justice by Green, Karen
Essays in Philosophy
Volume 7
Issue 1 Liberalism, Feminism, Multiculturalism Article 4
1-2006
Parity and Procedural Justice
Karen Green
Monash University
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip
Part of the Philosophy Commons
Essays in Philosophy is a biannual journal published by Pacific University Library | ISSN 1526-0569 | http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/
Recommended Citation
Green, Karen (2006) "Parity and Procedural Justice," Essays in Philosophy: Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Article 4.
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/green.html[9/18/2009 5:08:07 PM]
Essays in Philosophy
A Biannual Journal
Vol. 7, No. 1, January 2006
Parity and Procedural Justice
Feminist critiques of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, like feminist critiques of liberalism in general,
take two broad forms. The more extreme critiques aim to show that liberalism in general, and Rawls’
liberalism in particular, is incompatible with feminism.1 A less extreme internal critique attempts to
show, from within liberalism, that by liberalism’s own lights, actual liberal practice ought to be reformed
in order to bring it into line with feminism. The late Susan Moller Okin’s critique of Rawls took the
second form. Okin claimed that ‘a consistent and wholehearted application of Rawls’ liberal principles of
justice can lead us to challenge fundamentally the gender system of our society.’2 According to Okin the
major obstacle to women’s equal freedom and participation in liberal society is the pervasive gender
system, which determines differential duties within the family and differential social roles in the public
realm. She argued that since this gender system militates against the equal liberty of the sexes it ought to
be dismantled. She also thought that it would be possible to remain committed to liberalism while at the
same time dismantling both the ideological/representational and the practical aspects of the gender
system.
In this paper I briefly set out Okin’s position and then rehearse a number of criticisms of Okin
which together suggest that dismantling the gender system and adopting the principle of androgyny
would not be compatible with liberalism. This incompatibility appears to vindicate the extreme
feminist critique of liberalism. I argue that nevertheless a liberal feminism is possible. The liberal
feminist ought to adopt the principle of parity, that is, guaranteed equal representation of both sexes
in parliament, rather than the requirement of androgyny. Parity follows from a conception of
procedural justice, for it provides a mechanism which guarantees that the interests of both sexes are
fairly represented in the legislature. Parity may also go some way to alleviating the tensions which
exist between feminism and multiculturalism.
The argument that Okin developed began with the observation that the family is, according to
Rawls, a major social institution. Hence the principles of justice should apply to it. Yet, as Okin
points out, Rawls never raises the question of whether a traditional family structure would be
chosen from behind the veil of ignorance.3 This leads her to speculate as to what kind of family
structure would be chosen were it constructed according to the two principles of justice. She
concludes that it would be an egalitarian one in which duties were not determined by sex but were
shared equally between parents.4 She argues that Rawls’ account of the family as the ‘first school of
justice’ requires families to be just, since unless the family is structured in a just manner children
will not ‘develop a sufficiently …well rounded moral psychology to enable them to engage in the
kind of deliberation about justice that is exemplified in the original position.’5 Her conclusion is
that ‘the disappearance of gender is a prerequisite for the complete development of a non-sexist,
fully human theory of justice.’6 By ‘the disappearance of gender’ she means the complete
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disappearance of all gender stereotypes and all differences in the distribution of the sexes in all
occupations. One can sum up Okin’s argument by saying that it proposes that liberalism requires
androgyny.
Although this argument is offered in the spirit of a reform of liberalism there are a number of
reasons for thinking that the feminist implications that Okin draws are more destructive of
liberalism than she thinks. Like many feminists of her generation, Okin assumed that gender
difference is both socially constructed, and undesirable. She did not consider the possibility that the
gender system might have arisen out of biological features of sexual difference which result in
fundamental conflicts between the sexes, and fundamentally different strategies for survival.7 Nor
does she consider the possibility that women may value the preservation of gender difference. The
first of these observations leads to an argument against liberalism from a conservative perspective.
If biological difference implies that androgyny is impossible, and androgyny is a prerequisite for the
complete development of a non-sexist, fully human liberal theory of justice, then it would look as
though such a theory of justice is impossible. The second observation leads to an argument against
liberalism from the perspective of a radical feminism of difference. If liberalism requires the
abolition of gender and sexual difference, but this amounts to the abolition of the female gender and
its assimilation to the masculine, so much the worse for liberalism.
Objections to egalitarianism and androgyny, and by implication to liberal egalitarianism, have been
put forward by various French feminists who occasionally represent the attempt to abolish sexual
difference as equivalent to genocide.8 And various forms of the celebration of female difference,
and the positive aspects of a feminine standpoint, have been promoted by a raft of English speaking
feminists.9 Near the end of one of her discussions Okin deferred consideration of ‘the effect that the
consideration of women’s standpoint might have on Rawls’ theory of justice.’10 Since standpoint
theorists, like French feminists of difference, tend to emphasise the positive aspects of female
difference this deferral threatens Okin’s fundamental conclusion. In later articles she attempted both
to question the existence of a different standpoint, and to show that Rawlsian liberalism is not
fundamentally in conflict with issues of care and concern, but neither of these observations deflects
the obvious point of the above objection, which is that women do not universally agree that
androgyny is desirable.11
A second reason for questioning whether Okin has really offered only an internal critique of
liberalism is that the abolition of the gender system would imply radical interference in individual
liberty, and so would be ultimately illiberal. G. A. Cohen argues that Okin fails to understand the
force of the more extreme feminist critique of liberalism. Since abolishing the gender system would
involve constraints on personal choice in order to achieve an ideal feminist state, policies that
radically interfere with individual liberty would be inevitable.12 A society that attempted to impose
androgyny on all its members would both be imposing a conception of the good life on them, and
interfering in an area of private life that classically belongs to the sphere of personal freedom. A
liberal society would, surely, allow women the freedom to choose whether to be chaste or
promiscuous. It would allow them to choose whether to be ‘stay at home’ mothers, equal working
partners, bread-winners with male ‘stay at home’ husbands, mothers with lesbian partners, single
mothers, or childless. How could liberalism be committed to one single form of the good
reproductive life?
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Up to a point the defender of Okin-style androgyny might have replied to this objection by pointing
to systematic ambiguities in the notion of the private sphere. One notion of the private could be
called the ‘Rousseauist’ private sphere. This is that portion of one’s social group (family and
friends) with whom one’s relations are appropriately governed by love and partiality. The ‘Millian’
private sphere, by contrast, is defined in relation to the harm principle. According to Mill state
interference in an individual’s life is only warranted in order to prevent harm to others. From the
Millian perspective, those elements of the family and the gender system which can be shown to
cause harm to others (child abuse, violence against women, and perhaps pornography) can be
legitimately controlled.13 So, one could argue that since the gender system harms women,
interference with it is not incompatible with the liberal recognition of a private sphere defined as a
sphere of individual liberty. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how the harm of the gender system
could count as sufficiently obvious to justify the degree of state interference in personal life that
would be necessary in order to abolish it. Could one, for instance, still remain a liberal and believe
that an intelligent woman should have her liberty curtailed, because, having considered different
conceptions of the good life, she had decided that the gender stereotypical role of devoted mother
and home-maker was the one for her?
Furthermore, although the Rousseauist public/private distinction has been associated with a model
of liberalism that has excluded women from equal opportunity and power, there are various reasons
for thinking that humans will not want to entirely abolish a private sphere governed by love and
affection.14 There is also a danger in Okin’s weakening of the prohibition on interference in the
domestic sphere, which could have consequences that are inimical to women. Okin provisionally
accepts the truth of psychological accounts of gender development that propose that equal parenting
is important for the development of an androgynous and just character. She uses this to argue for
equal parenting. Other psychological research suggests the importance of attachment to the mother,
or a small number of primary care-givers, for the healthy psychological/moral development of the
child. Since Okin accepts interference in the private sphere in order to prevent the harm of gender
stereotyping, she leaves open the possibility that the harm principle could be used to force women
to stay at home. The thought that working mothers may harm their children is already being used in
Australia to justify offering tax incentives to stay at home mothers. But one might well wonder
whether it is the business of the liberal state to advantage one form of family formation over others.
In so far as it is the business of the state to require those who are responsible for children to give
them the care necessary for them to develop into morally motivated citizens, the state has a right to
interfere in family affairs. But there is little reason not to expect that quite a variety of family
formations are satisfactory in this regard, and those who claim otherwise often appear to be doing
no more than attempting to impose their conception of the good life on others.
The last reason for thinking that Okin’s opposition to the gender system results in an illiberal
feminism is that it puts her on a collision course with multiculturalism, which has itself been argued
for on liberal grounds.15 On the one hand, liberal societies seem committed to allowing people the
freedom to develop different conceptions of the good life, and to preserve cultural traditions which
are important for individual identity. Yet many cultures involve deeply entrenched gender systems.
To mention only one example, Muslims in France, asserting the freedom to practice their faith and
live according to their own traditions, want their daughters to cover their heads, and require that
they do so particularly in the mixed environment of a public school. However, the French
government, wanting children in school to be given an equal education, and perhaps suspecting that
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girls who are taught from an early age that modesty is paramount will not compete equally in later
life, has banned headscarves in school. This apparently trivial issue has generated extraordinary
heat. The headscarf, represented by one side as a symbol of religious faith and liberty, symbolizes
according to feminist opponents an oppressive regime of gender difference. For such feminists it is
the outer sign of the submission of Muslim women to a perverse requirement of modesty, which
restricts women’s freedom, and results in unwanted sexual advances being blamed on the female
victim, rather than on the male perpetrator.
Together these difficulties with Okin’s attempt to make Rawls’ liberalism compatible with
feminism might make one feel that Cohen is correct and that Okin has not appreciated the force of
the more extreme feminist critique which insists that feminism goes beyond liberalism. Feminism,
as Okin conceives of it, is a substantive theory of the good and thus does not seem capable of
trumping other conceptions of the good when they conflict with it.
In the remainder of this paper I will propose another way of developing an internal feminist critique
of Rawls’ conception of procedural justice. Although Rawls mentions ‘the monogamous family’ as
a major social institution, it is possible that on reflection he should accept that what he said was
misleading.16 Indeed, in his later Political Liberalism he excises reference to the ‘monogamous
family’ and confesses that he has not dealt with ‘the justice of and in the family’ though he does
assume that ‘in some form the family is just.’17 He should perhaps have said that, in at least some
of its forms, the family is just, for the family does not have a single form, and it is not at all clear
that there is one family form that is required by liberalism, or that liberalism requires anything very
like the traditional family. Fair equality of opportunity, for instance, conflicts with traditional family
loyalty and partiality.18 And early Zionist experiments with the Kibbutz which attempted to
expunge such family loyalties appear to have been compatible with liberalism.
In two provocative articles Véronique Munoz-Dardé explores an argument for abolishing the family
in order to realise true equality of opportunity, and considers replacing it with ‘well run
orphanages.’19 Yet, too many humans place too great a store on the pleasures of producing and
bringing up their own children for any such arrangement to be likely to be widely chosen. Justice is
surely compatible with the continued existence of families, but even given that one has decided that
biological families can be just voluntary associations, this leaves open the possibility of many
family forms. If voluntary polygyny and polyandry are intrinsically illiberal, this needs to be argued
for. It needs to be shown why it would not be just for women to exploit the liberty they have to
give birth to children outside marriage in order to exclude men from parenthood. Or why it would
be unjust for men to leave all the burdens of parenting to women.20 It may be that the family is a
major social institution in any society, but the forms of family that one would expect to find in
liberal societies are surely not predetermined. Rawls’ early assumption that ‘monogamous marriage’
was a just major social institution of liberalism needed justification, but so too does the assumption
that monogamous marriage is illiberal.
It may well be that it is only a legacy of historical powerlessness which leads so many women to
continue to aspire to marriage, a home in the suburbs, and 2.3 children. Yet it is not clear that
differences in life-style choices between the sexes are always coerced. Indeed, Sarah Hrdy,
examining marriage from a socio-biological perspective, has argued that monogamous marriage is
the most harmonious solution to two problems which beset reproduction: the conflicting
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reproductive interests of men and women, and the conflicts of interest that exist between men.
Monogamy is just to men, because with monogamy they each have an equal chance to reproduce. It
benefits women and children, because when a male cares for children that he knows are his own,
this relieves women of some of the burden of care, and helps ensure the survival of offspring.21
Although these speculations do suggest that, from behind the veil of ignorance, monogamy would
be preferred, they still leave much in the air. Should monogamy be indissoluble, as early Christians
believed?22 Is divorce just, and under what conditions? What women and men would choose with
regard to the family, from behind the veil of ignorance, is difficult to determine, because this choice
would itself depend on what they believed to be the case concerning their vulnerability to
pregnancy, their desires as members of their sex, and their beliefs about how members of the
opposite sex would be inclined to treat them. Indeed what appears to be needed is a just mechanism
for determining issues concerning the justice of, and within, various family formations. A family
court is one such mechanism, but what is more important is the process that determines the
structure of the court and the character of the laws administered by it.
We should therefore tackle the issue of feminism and the family from the top down. Rawls’ theory
of justice as fairness is represented by him as using the idea of pure procedural justice.23 ‘Pure
procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion for the right result: instead there is
a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair.’24 Applying this to
systems of gender difference and the family one should conclude that so long as a system of
specific institutions and family law is the outcome of a just procedure it will count as just. What
procedure for determining the appropriate family constitution would then be fair? Well, clearly, at a
minimum, one in which men and women are equally represented. From this point of view the way
to guarantee that the laws actually passed will take into account the differences in interest between
the sexes is not to mandate equality in all things (androgyny) but rather to mandate equal
representation in parliament and other elected legislative bodies (parity). Androgyny only seems to
be required by feminism if one imagines women having to compete as equals with men in the
public sphere in order to gain equal access to power, and in particular to political power. But if one
thinks that the fundamental equality is political equality, one should conclude that only a procedure
that mandates equal representation for both sexes could be chosen from behind the veil of
ignorance. Once one has parity one can leave the choice between androgyny and gender difference
to be determined by individuals within a framework of law that is informed as much by the voices
of women as by those of men.
One might, nevertheless, wonder whether the demand for parity remains within the assumption of
liberal equality. For the argument for parity has had greatest contemporary currency in France,
where it is associated with feminisms of difference. It has been claimed, for instance, that ‘parity
interrogates universalism.’25 And egalitarian feminists have voiced the suspicion that parity may
merely entrench differences rather than remove them.26 However, the assumption of innate sexual
difference is not essential to the argument for parity. Nor is the assumption that gender differences
are not natural. Parity can be argued for independently of whether one thinks that gender is merely
socially constructed, and the means of imposing sexual inequality, or whether one thinks that it is
grounded in valuable or ineliminable differences between the sexes. Either way, parity provides a
just procedure.
Suppose that, despite the considerable socio-biological evidence to the contrary, there are no natural
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or basic differences of interest between the sexes, but that the differences that appear are only the
result of an unjustly imposed gender system. Then parity can be expected simply to speed up the
disappearance of the gender system, which would have come about anyway under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity. Suppose, on the other hand, that there are some fundamental differences in
interest between the sexes. Then parity will possibly lead to significant changes in society, as it
comes to reflect the interests of women to the same extent that it reflects the interests of men. So,
parity is needed, in so far as humankind is sexed, but insofar as sexual difference does not amount
to a difference in the nature of humanity, parity can stand in for universalism. The argument for
parity goes through no matter whether one takes gender difference to be socially constructed, and to
be ultimately eliminable, or whether one celebrates sexual difference.
Unlike androgyny, parity does not automatically result in an outright conflict between feminism and
liberalism’s commitment to a sphere of private liberty. Under a system of parity, legitimate and
illegitimate interference in family affairs will be determined by a parliament in which men and
women are equally represented. Given differences among women as to how they wish to organise
their reproductive lives, as well as differences among men, it is likely that laws will allow various
systems of family formation within a framework that protects children, diverts a generous
proportion of the society’s wealth towards their well-being, assures fathers’ parental rights, and
protects women from vulnerabilities that arise from their being those who become pregnant.
What then of the conflict that arises between feminism and multi-culturalism? Would it still exist
under liberal parity? Here the outcome is more ambiguous. Where minority cultures do discriminate
against women, laws that were passed by a parliament in which men and women were equally
represented might conflict quite sharply with the practices of those minority cultures. But there
would be compensatory forces under a system of parity. Where minority cultures are repressive, the
few representatives whose voices are heard are characteristically men. Muslim men assert that Islam
treats women as equals, and that Islamic dress codes are in women’s interests, but these arguments
are unconvincing when they come from the mouths of men. They are far more convincing when
argued by women, even if, as a Western feminist, one remains convinced that these women have
mistaken their own best interests. Parity would increase the probability that women from minority
cultures, as well as their men-folk, would achieve some level of representation in elected forums.
This would engender more public debate among women, and between women and men, and would
help in the determination of which differences in the treatment of the sexes amount to acceptable
diversity of cultural forms, and which are merely legacies of past patriarchal domination.
Many cultural groups argue that they treat women differently to men for women’s own sake. From
the point of view of liberal parity these claims will ring hollow unless the cultural groups allow
women the same participation in the formation of the rules governing the differential treatment of
the sexes that they confer on men. But if, in any country, a gender system is the outcome of a
process of deliberation in a legislative forum in which men and women are equally represented,
their deliberations taken equally seriously, and their authority to read and interpret scripture equally
recognised, the believer in parity will have to deem this system just, even when it conflicts with her
own traditions and conception of the good life. Thus parity offers a challenge to other cultures
whose practices appear to us to be unjust to women. Demonstrate that the women of your culture
approve of these practices when they are given the freedom and power to determine, in partnership
with men, the laws under which they live, and the practices will be acknowledged as just. But if the
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procedure which determines the laws which govern women is one from which women are excluded,
or in which they are only marginally represented, those laws cannot be judged, by any reliable
criterion, to be in women’s interests.
Given that the liberal feminist is convinced that parity rather than androgyny is what feminism
requires of an internally reformed liberalism, the difficulties for feminism become practical. In
countries with multimember electorates (such as France) a form of parity can be imposed by
requiring that equal numbers of the sexes are preselected, and their names distributed fairly on lists
of candidates. In Westminster systems it is more difficult to determine the exact nature of the
reform required. One proposal has been that women should vote for women, men for men.27 But
this looks like a mistake which entrenches too deeply a conception of society as sexually divided.
Another would be to give each single person two votes, one for a female one for a male candidate.
Yet another possibility would be to require that parties preselect couples. This has some advantages.
It would be less likely than the system of giving each person two votes to result in hung
parliaments. It would also provide someone that each woman and man could identify as their
representative with regard to those issues which involve sexual difference.
Perhaps the most practical and least radical reform would be simply to mandate that parties endorse
as many female as male candidates. This will be represented by some as a questionable form of
positive discrimination, and as going against fair equality of opportunity for men, but no doubt any
system which undermines men’s historical monopoly on political power will raise objections. From
behind the veil of ignorance individuals will know that women have been historically largely
excluded by men from the process of determining the structure of the family and the character of
family law. Not wanting to live, should they happen to be women, by a law which is biased against
them, they would rationally choose to be equally represented in the assemblies that determine this
law.
Both liberalism and feminism are contested notions. Some liberals value freedom over equality of
liberty. They are likely to consider parity illiberal, because it places restrictions on the freedom to
compete for parliamentary places. Some feminists have very definite ideas about the nature of the
good life required by feminism. They are likely to consider parity insufficient, since it would do
nothing to ensure that the women elected to parliament are in favour of feminism as they conceive
it. Nevertheless, parity, as proposed in this paper, conforms with Rawls’ liberalism, and in
particular with his conception of justice as fairness. For it requires a fair outcome in the
competition for parliamentary places. It is also feminist, in that it requires that the sexes exercise
equal political power. Thus it is parity, rather than androgyny, which is required by a liberalism that
has been purified by an internal feminist critique.
Karen Green
Monash University
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